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IntroductIon*
The recent financial crisis has also had a fundamental impact on labour mar-
kets. European countries were forced to re-think and often reform their labour 
market institutions with flexibility and security in mind, and all this amidst 
shrinking financial resources. In this context it is crucially important to give 
a clear and accurate overview of the policy tools that can influence the opera-
tion of the economy. Apart from these global events, the fact that Hungary has 
one of the lowest employment rates within the European Union also makes 
the overview of labour market institutions most timely. Low employment is a 
major obstacle to economic growth.
This chapter continues the tradition of the Hungarian Labour Market Year 
Book that has reviewed changes in the labour market institutions each year, 
however this time it is presented in a slightly different format. We have created 
a structure that is closely related to the labour market and its forces; measures 
influencing prices, quantities and costs.
Market prices (most importantly wages) are determined by transfers, tax-
es, contributions, alternative incomes are influenced by available insurance-
based (unemployment allowance, pension) or means-tested payments (for ex-
ample social benefit type assistance, children’s benefits), costs are determined 
by certain types of assistance (for example towards the cost of commuting or 
childcare provision) and services (such as human services provided for unem-
ployed people or job search services). The structure of the labour market and 
the relationships that are formed with the labour market are shaped by con-
tractual possibilities, transaction costs and mechanisms of dialogue between 
social partners. The effectiveness and stability of the above institutions are de-
termined by policy structures and policy-making mechanisms.
We classify employment policy measures according to the classification used 
by Eurostat in its Labour Market Policy (LMP) database. In addition catego-
ries from the LABREF database of the European Commission’s Directorate 
General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) are also used here 
(European Commission, 2005). These include broader – labour market related – 
policies such as tax and social policies that are strongly inter-related. Overall, we 
can distinguish labour market and labour market related policies.1 Our choice 
The classification of em-
ployment policy measures 
according to the Labour 
Market Policy Database 
of Eurostat
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has been influenced by two factors. First, so far there has been no comprehensive 
classification in Hungary, which is probably explained by the limited interest 
in this issue (see also Chapter 7 of In Focus on the evaluation of active labour 
market policies in Hungary). Second, we wanted to prepare the overview in a 
comparable format based on some existing practice that makes it possible to 
continue the overview even if policies change considerably.
We aim to give a balanced overview of each issue, however there are topics 
that will be discussed in more detail; these are key employment policy meas-
ures that are likely to have a large impact on the Hungarian labour market in 
their revised form. There are some categories and sub-categories in the inter-
national classification that do not have any corresponding policies or subsidies 
either because they no longer exist or have never existed in Hungary. These 
will be mentioned only briefly.
Beside the overview of employment policies another aim of the study was to 
indicate government expenditure in this area. However, this was impossible be-
cause we could not consolidate expenditure from European Union co-financed 
projects – that are highly important – with other labour market policies into 
a single structure. Without this, detailed financial data would be misleading.
It should be emphasised that this study does not aim to provide an evaluation 
of policies or in other words an assessment of whether they had an effect on the 
labour market or not, and whether they are adequate (achieve the intended aims 
and are efficient) or not. We provide an overview of policy measures that under 
certain conditions can have an effect on the labour market based on some the-
oretical considerations or empirical results or the perception of policymakers.
Nevertheless the evaluation of specific policy measures is very important and 
to facilitate this we briefly present their possible mechanism of action, highlight 
any existing evaluations and attempt to point out any differences between them 
and the measures discussed in the evaluation studies that might modify its effect. 
The interested reader can then make the judgment. Considering that this is the 
first time the chapter is presented in this format, we also provide a brief overview 
of the situation before the changes. The system and policies are presented accord-
ing to the situation in September 2011 and we acknowledge that there might be 
changes by the time the study is published. However, only policies that have ac-
tually been rolled out are presented, policy proposals and bills that have not been 
voted by the Parliament are not discussed here. For each measure we indicate 
when they come into force. The starting point of the study is September 2010.
We aimed for maximum clarity in the wording and tried to keep the length 
of study within reasonable limits. We also aimed to provide the most accu-
rate picture possible. This meant that some compromises were necessary: we 
do mention all important policy changes, however briefly. Some of the text is 
presented in bullet points that hopefully will facilitate clearer understanding. 
We considered four questions:
Four questions to con-
sider when analysing 
employment policy 
measures
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– Answering the question How does it work? we provide the theoretical basis 
of the policy measure: who does what and why. This does not address imple-
mentation or efficiency and it is assumed that the measure serves its intended 
purpose. This question is not asked for labour market related but not direct 
employment policies because it would be too far-reaching and divert us from 
our topic.2
– For the question What is the impact on employment? we present general in-
formation on the effectiveness of the measure based on empirical results. It is 
important to highlight that for labour market policies the employment effect 
is the primary, intended aim, but the intended aim of labour market related 
policies is usually something else and the employment effect is not necessarily 
intended even if it is sometimes very strong.
– Under the heading Situation in September 2010 we present the status quo 
on the 1st of September, 2010 according to the criteria outlined below.
– For the question Changes between September 2010 and September 2011 we 
provide an overview of the most important changes. Considering the limita-
tions of space this description does not aim for completeness for various rea-
sons. On the one hand the system of financial assistance and measures is very 
fragmented in Hungary and presenting all relatively minor (in terms of access 
and expenditure) interventions would be a disproportionately huge task both 
for the authors and the readers of the chapter. Therefore where necessary we 
were selective both in terms of the employment effect and the scope of interven-
tions. Second, there are so many rules for every intervention that presenting all 
of them would have made the already long text even longer (three or four times 
its current length) and thus very difficult to read. Third and most importantly 
our aim was not to present the legislation in detail, this can be found elsewhere, 
but to give an overview of the full range of measures and their most important 
characteristics. Therefore readers who are interested in the detailed rules for 
each measure should refer to the original legal texts.
Under the heading Main legislation we present the main laws and regula-
tions governing the given area and any legal amendments down to the level of 
ministerial regulations and any other, publicly available, information on im-
plementation. The main legislation is available free of charge on the Internet. 
Our main sources were the Hungarian Gazette (Magyar Közlöny; www.mag-
yarkozlony.hu) and the Official Journal of the European Union, but there are 
other useful sources such as the on-line collection of current legislation that 
is available free of charge to anyone (http://mkogy.complex.hu). Legislation 
under the level of a ministerial regulation is not readily available. They are ei-
ther available in a summary format for end users or can be obtained from the 
relevant authorities. Together with the exact reference to legislation we also 
provide the web addresses (where they exist) of relevant authorities to facili-
tate internet-based search.
2 In most cases this is not very 
different from the original 
aim, but sometimes it is. For 
example studies analysing the 
original documents from the 
introduction of child care allow-
ance clearly point it out that its 
introduction was motivated by 
the “peaceful” withdrawal of fe-
male workforce from the labour 
market. Today the same action 
is often justified with children’s 
developmental needs.
Sources of main legislation
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components of Labour market and Labour market reLated 
poLIcIes
Labour market policies are public interventions in the labour market that ex-
plicitly aim to improve the efficiency of the market, address disequilibria and 
typically selectively favour particular groups on the labour market. The term 
labour market policy is equivalent to the term employment policy commonly 
used in Hungary in its broadest meaning and it includes both active and pas-
sive policies as well as labour market services.
The “common denominator” of labour market policies of the EU and OECD 
member states is the Labour Market Policy (LMP) database, created under 
the direction of the Eurostat. This provides comparable data on expenditure 
and participants in labour market policies in each member state. The meth-
odology of the database distinguishes three types of interventions that are 
termed 1. services, 2.measures and 3. supports. Based on section 1.2 of Europe-
an Commission (2006, p. 6) these are defined as follows including the mixed 
interventions:
Services refer to labour market interventions related to the job-search activ-
ity of participants and where participation usually does not directly result in a 
change of labour market status (but often does indirectly). Services also cover 
functions of the Public Employment Service (PES) that are not directly linked 
to jobseekers. This includes placement and other services for employers, ad-
ministrative functions, and other activities delegated to the PES.
Measures are labour market interventions where the main task of participants 
is not job-search and where participation usually (but not necessarily) results 
in a change in labour market status. These include activation programs such 
as training, wage subsidy and different forms of public works.
Supports refer to interventions that provide financial assistance, directly or 
indirectly, to individuals for labour market reasons or which compensate indi-
viduals for their disadvantage on the labour market. These include unemploy-
ment benefits such as the jobseeker’s allowance and benefit or the means-tested 
income maintenance assistance.
Mixed interventions are those schemes that employ more than one interven-
tion – that might be in different groups or categories.
The target groups of labour market policy include the unemployed, employ-
ees at risk (those who are in employment but are at risk of involuntary job loss 
due to the economic circumstances of the employer, restructuring, or similar) 
and the inactive. The government delivers labour market policies primarily 
through specialist institutions that might include a public or private (or mixed) 
Employment Service and market-based service providers. Interventions have 
been classified according to the categories of LMP as follows.3
3 For the detailed methodology 
see KSH (2009).
Labour market policy 
– all employment policy 
measures
Target groups of labour 
market policies
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Classification of labour market policy interventions by type of action
Services
1. Labour market services
Measures
2. Training
3. Job rotation and job sharing
4. Employment incentives
5. Supported employment and rehabilitation / integration of people with 
reduced work capacity
6. Direct job creation
7. Start-up incentives
Supports
8. Out of work income maintenance and supports
9. Early retirement
Mixed interventions (complex programs)
Labour markets are also influenced indirectly by measures other than labour 
market / employment policies – for example by the tax system that influences 
the price of labour. If the government aims to promote the labour market in-
clusion of a group characterised by low employment levels then it might reduce 
the tax burden on their work. In most countries demand for unskilled labour 
as well as their work motivation is relatively sensitive to wage costs. In this con-
text the government might increase employment by the appropriate calibration 
of the tax system; reducing the tax burden on lower wages. The definition of 
these indirect measures is based on a simplified, but still comparable, version 
of the LABREF database. Definitions follow Part 3 of European Commission 
(2005) and supplementary areas are defined as follows.
Labour market related policy measures, excluding LMPs
10. Labour taxation
11. Other transfers
12. Job protection – contractual arrangements
13. Old age and disability pensions system – disability supports
14. Wage bargaining and wage regulation
15. Migration and mobility related measures
16. Management and evaluation of employment policy
Labour taxation. This includes personal income tax, social security contri-
butions paid by employees and employers, coverage and rates.
Other transfers. These include transfers that influence the cost and opportu-
nity cost of work. The first includes means-tested benefits such as the housing 
assistance and travel to work schemes (e.g. those targeted at commuters) and 
the second includes assistance with child care.
Policy measures with 
an indirect effect on the 
labour market
Labour taxation
Other transfers
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Job protection and contractual arrangements. These cover changes in the regu-
latory environment of work contracts, particularly rights and responsibilities 
related to different types of contracts, permanent and temporary contracts, 
as well as rules governing dismissal of workers. We also include working time 
related measures here.
Old-age and disability pension – disability assistance. This covers the avail-
ability of old-age and disability pensions, their starting rate and increments, 
the conditions of early retirement.
Wage bargaining and wage regulation. Includes the regulation of wage bar-
gaining and any direct or indirect wage regulations that influence the level of 
wages nationally or regionally.
Migration and mobility related measures. These include rules on the employ-
ment of foreigners, selective immigration policies and the formal recognition of 
qualifications gained abroad. It also includes measures related to internal mobil-
ity, such as measures influencing the share of rented housing and home ownership.
Institutions of management and evaluation of employment policy. These in-
clude institutions that make and implement policies (the relevant ministry and 
particular units, the National Employment Service and its agencies, the Na-
tional Development Agency or more recently the Ecostat Government Centre 
for Impact Assessment) and any changes related to them.
Labour market related policies might be – and if used consciously they are – 
tuned to the needs of specific target groups, but as a general principle they cover 
the whole of the population.
Labour market poLIcy measures
The foundations of the Hungarian labour market policy were laid down by 
Act 4 of 1991, commonly known as the Employment Act. The policies set out 
by the Act are commonly referred to as employment policy measures in the 
Hungarian technical terminology.
Services
1. Labour market services
A) Services of the National Employment Service
How does it work? Labour market services help the labour market integra-
tion of the unemployed and other job seekers, and help employers to recruit 
and select their workforce. Services thus partly address the lack of informa-
tion and partly enhance the adaptability of parties helping the matching of 
job seekers and employers.
What is the impact on employment? An efficient information provision ser-
vice can improve the lack of information and information asymmetry and 
Job protection and con-
tractual arrangements
Old age pension, disability 
pension and disability as-
sistance
Wage regulation
Mobility
Employment policy 
insitutions
Labour market integra-
tion, matching
Addressing lack of informa-
tion and information as-
symetry
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thus increase the flexibility of the labour market. This can directly or also in-
directly increase employment by reducing wages through increased competi-
tion. Information services need to be provided on an on-going basis but for 
automated systems the cost of maintenance can remain well under the initial 
cost of investment. There are no empirical studies on the labour market im-
pact of information services in Hungary. International results were reported 
for example by Calmfors (2004) and Martin and Grubb (2001). They found 
that information services had a positive effect but this could not be separated 
from sanctions and statutory functions.
Situation in September 2010. In Hungary labour market services can be ac-
cessed via the job centres and the website of the National Employment Service 
(NES) in two main forms:
a) Information services: are open services for job seekers providing ad hoc in-
formation and referral to opportunities for work, training and other forms of 
assistance; it also includes job brokerage services for employers.
b) Client services: Cover provision of individualised case management ser-
vices (for example intensive counselling and guidance, job search assistance 
and personalised action plans) and follow-up for jobseekers. It also includes 
financial supports provided to jobseekers (such as the cost of travel to job in-
terviews, other job search related costs etc.).
Information services and client services might cover various areas, for ex-
ample the provision of labour market and employment information; job, ca-
reer, job search and rehabilitation advice, local (area) employment services. 
The most important information service is job brokerage. It can be provided 
as self-service with direct access to information (i.e. websites such as http://
www.munka.hu, http://epalya.hu and its more recent version http://eletpalya.
munka.hu, or http://eures.europa.eu), or through specialist human services 
(e.g. job search clubs, guidance etc.). These can be provided on an individual 
basis or for groups of jobseekers. Information services can be provided inde-
pendently or as part of guidance,a job fair, job brokerage or referral for train-
ing. They can be provided on job centre premises or on external premises such 
as rehabilitation information centres, work information centres, job advisors or 
the EUROFIT network that provides international work information, em-
ployment information points and the EURES network, the European job mo-
bility service, European employment services. The network of career services 
provides advice for choosing and changing career.4
Some of the services for jobseekers and employers are provided jointly by the 
NES and its partner organisations or are contracted out to accredited service 
providers.5 The NES does not have a statutory role in most services, however 
in the case of job brokerage it does because jobseekers can lose their eligibility 
for jobseeker’s allowance if they do not accept suitable job offers.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. There were no substan-
4 In the first phase of SROP 2.2 
project the procedures of Life-
long Guidance were prepared. 
The National Career Orientation 
Portal has been operational since 
September 2010 that is the inte-
grated career information por-
tal of lifelong career guidance 
(http://eletpalya.munka.hu/).
5 The priority project SROP 2.6.1 
Establishing the system of service 
provider accreditation ended on 
December 31, 2010. The part-
ners of the project together with 
representatives of independent 
employment service provid-
ers developed definition and 
standards for 48 labour market 
services, defined accreditation 
criteria and procedures. More 
details can be found on the web-
site of the project (http://www.
tamop261.hu/)
Provision of information 
and individualised services
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tial changes during this period; the statute of the NES confirmed the activities of 
the NES in the provision of labour market services and all services were available.
Main legislation
The scope of labour market services are set out by Act 4 of 1991, Article 13/A, 
paragraph 2. The types of services are listed in MoE Ministerial Regulation 
no. 30/2000. (15. 11). Job brokerage is delegated to the NES by Article 7 of the 
Government Regulation no. 315/2010. (27. 12).
New legislation: Government Regulation no. 315/2010. (27. 12) on the Stat-
ute of the National Employment Service and the Employment Office (Official 
Journal, issue 9, 2011. February 8. pp. 1065–1068.
On-line resources: http://www.munka.hu/engine.aspx?page=allaskeresoknek, 
http://www.munka.hu/engine.aspx?page=munkaadoknak, http://www.ta-
mop261.hu/.
B) Other activities of the National Employment Service
How do they work? Activities other than the provision of services by the 
employment service include administration, and they are often statutory or 
related to the management and implementation of policies at the local level. 
Accordingly they are concerned with the efficient management and imple-
mentation of policies.
What is their impact on employment? Besides the provision of services, oth-
er activities of the employment service can also help re-employment of the 
unemployed if implemented efficiently. For example using client profiling 
to provide the most adequate services to different unemployed clients (e.g. 
in terms of education, work experience). Also adequate monitoring of job-
search activity and sanctions for non-compliance can also be very useful – see 
Card, Kluve and Weber (2010) for more on this. There is limited information 
on the impact of other activities. The potential impact of their reform was 
examined by the evaluation study of the PES modernisation (Cseres-Gergely 
& Scharle, 2010). It was found that the development of services might have 
contributed to the positive impact of the modernisation; however it was not 
possible to isolate its impact. Micklewright and Nagy (2005) experiment-
ed with the implementation of stricter sanctions in Hungary. Their results 
showed that increased sanctions – that were still considerably less stringent 
than sanctions used in some other countries – had a more limited impact in 
Hungary than elsewhere.
Situation in September 2010. The three areas of the employment service’s 
other activities are as follows:
1. The administration of labour market measures: the management / co-ordi-
nation of employers and services providers engaged as direct recipients in these 
measures, other activities related to the management and implementation of 
labour market measures – e.g. planning, co-ordination, monitoring, evaluation, 
Administrative and 
statutory roles
Client profiling, moni-
toring and sanctions
Administration, coordi-
nation, monitoring, eval-
uation, decision-making
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decision making, etc., and any other functions directly related to the provision 
of labour market measures but which cannot be attributed to a specific measure.
2. The administration of labour market supports: covers activities related to 
the administration and payment of supports and / or the supervision by the 
NES of other bodies that undertake the payment and administration functions. 
Activities include for example the registration and monitoring of beneficiaries 
(where not directly linked to on-going monitoring of job-search activity), and 
the payment of benefits, validation of claims, etc.
3. Other services / activities: covers all other services, activities and general 
overheads of the public employment service which are not covered in any oth-
er category of the LMP database. For example vocational health assessment, 
wage guarantees and issuing work permits for foreign workers.
Important stages in the individual case management of clients are the ini-
tial assessment, drawing up a jobseeker’s action plan based on the needs and 
characteristics of the individual jobseeker, assessing the entitlement and el-
igibility for financial support and payment of support, the monitoring of 
job-search activity and the closure of the case or referral for social assistance 
(currently public works, income maintenance assistance or regular social as-
sistance). The jobseeker’s agreement was binding for those claiming financial 
supports from the PES until December 31, 2010 and those who breached the 
agreement lost their eligibility for the allowance/assistance. After signing the 
agreement jobseekers were required to attend interviews with their job cen-
tre advisor on a regular basis but no less than once every three months and 
report on their job-search activity. Not only jobseekers, but other clients of 
the job centre (such as people with reduced work capacity) were also required 
to sign a binding agreement.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. As of January 1, 2011 
the seven independent regional job centres were transformed into 20 job centres 
and incorporated into the county government offices. An important change 
in the organisation of job centres after September 2011 was that about half of 
the staff has been dealing with the administration of public works.
The jobseeker’s agreement has no longer been a requirement since January 
1, 2011, nevertheless it is still useful (although not mandatory) to plan and re-
cord each step of the cooperation. Those claiming rehabilitation allowance are 
still required to sign a rehabilitation agreement.
Main legislation
Activities related to registered unemployed (registered jobseekers) are set out 
by Act 4 of 1991 (Employment Act).
New legislation: Government Regulation no. 315/2010. (27. 12) on the Ac-
tivities of the National Employment Service. Its budget is set out by Act 169 
of 2010 on the 2011 budget of the Republic of Hungary. The statues for the 
new job centres were published in the Official Journal, 2011, issue 9. Ministry 
Job search plan, jobseeker’s 
agreement – compulsory 
until the end of 2010
Seven instead of tweny 
job centres, shorter peri-
od with no compulsory 
requirements
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for National Economy Regulation (MfNER) no. 2/2011. (14. 1) on register-
ing and de-registering as a jobseeker.
On-line resources: http://www.munka.hu.
Active labour market policies (Lmp measures)
2. Training programs
How do they work? Training programs aim to improve the employability of 
participants by providing new skills that are sought after on the labour mar-
ket and increase the likelihood of finding or keeping a job, or increase partici-
pants’ earnings potential
What is their impact on employment? Training can have an impact on employ-
ment if its curriculum is relevant and the participants are capable of learning 
new skills. In this case training can have a lasting positive impact on the em-
ployability of participants and possibly their earning potential which might 
help to increase employment without increasing public expenditure. Kluve 
(2010) argued that training programs are less effective forms of active measures 
if they do not improve considerably the employability of participants. The long 
term analysis of training programs by Card, Kluve and Weber (2010) slightly 
changed this picture by showing that adequately targeted training can have 
a positive effect, although this develops over a longer period of time. O’Leary 
(1998) analysed the effect of training programs in Hungary over a decade ago, 
and a similar analysis was presented by Csoba, Nagy and Szabó (2010) more re-
cently (see also Chapter 4 of In Focus). Galasi, Nagy and Lázár (1999) also ad-
dressed the effectiveness of training programs. Results from Hungary showed 
that training programs slightly improved the employability of participants; 
however none of the studies followed the participants as long as Card, Kluve 
and Weber (2010) to find significant positive labour market effects.
Situation in September 2010 (July – August 2010). Training supports can be 
claimed by jobseekers and employees at risk and the economically inactive. En-
titlement and eligibility for the support is assessed by the job centre. The sup-
port can take various forms such as income maintenance assistance (or income 
support for those in work), the reimbursement of training and exam costs and 
expenses related to accommodation, food and travel.
Training can be aimed at improving the employability of unemployed or 
help employees to remain in work. Training can be provided by public or pri-
vate providers.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. There were no changes 
in the structure and availability of training in this period, however a number 
of important decisions were made for the future.
The network of training institutions are to be re-organised. The nine inde-
pendent regional training centres were merged into the Budapest Centre for 
Aim: increasing em-
ployment prospects
Major institutional 
changes
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Labour Market Interventions (BCLMI) and thus ceased to exist as of Decem-
ber 18, 2011. The name of BCLMI changed to István Türr Training and Re-
search Institute as of June 30, 2011. The Institute replaced the previous public 
agencies and took over its activities in the areas of training, regional and social 
development and public works.
With the reallocation of European Union resources (see the description of 
other measures and complex programs) a greater emphasis has been placed on 
training programs within Priority 2 – Improving adaptability – of the Social 
Renewal Operational Program (SROP). As opposed to programs under Pri-
ority 1 these are not managed by the employment service but the Managing 
Authority of the Human Resources Program.
Main legislation
Labour market training is regulated by Article 14 of Act 4 of 1991 (Employ-
ment Act) and Article 1 of Ministry of Labour (MoL) Regulation no. 6/1996. 
(16. 07.).
New legislation: Training centres are regulated by the Ministry of Public Ad-
ministration and Justice (MoPAJ) Regulation no. 3/2011. (11. 02) and Article 
6 of MoPAJ Regulation 19/2011. (24. 06) on its amendment. The action plan 
for Priority 2 of SROP is published in Government Regulation no. 1013/2011.
On-line resources: http://www.munka.hu/engine.aspx?page =allas kere-
soknek_kepzes, http://www.munka.hu/engine.aspx?page =munkaadoknak_
kepzes, http://www.tkki.hu.
3. Job rotation and job sharing
How does it work? These measures support the (re-)employment of the un-
employed or people from other target groups by dividing the working hours 
of already existing jobs and thus allowing them to work.
What is the impact on employment? This measure can increase the employ-
ment level if the employment of additional workers on the same job does not 
result in the job loss of others. Job sharing is only possible if the job is suitable 
for sharing, the workers are motivated to job share and they are satisfied with 
their wages. If the wage adjustment cancels out the effect of increased employ-
ment then job sharing is not an effective employment policy measure (Layard, 
Nickell and Jackman 1991). The impact of job sharing is less clear-cut on smaller 
and dense labour markets as well as rigid wage structures.
Situation in September 2010. No job sharing and job rotation labour market 
measures existed in Hungary before the end of 2010.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. As of January 1, 2011 
employers pay only 20% social security contributions instead of the 27% for 
eligible employees. To be eligible for the support the wages should be no more 
than 200% of the statutory minimum wage and the employee should be re-
turning from child care leave. Further conditions are that the job should be 
Criterion of success: re-
employment without 
crowding out others
Reduced social security 
contributions for job 
sharers
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shared between the returning employee and the worker who had been hired for 
their temporary replacement (or a new worker) and the working time should 
be shared equally between them (20 hours for each). These conditions should 
be met for at least one year. The support can be paid for up to three years and 
it cannot be combined with other supports or reliefs.
Main legislation
Article 8/B of ‘Start’ Act (Act 123 of 2004)
New legislation: Act 123 of 2010 on taxation.
4. Employment incentives
How does it work? The aim of employment incentives is to support the em-
ployment of unemployed people or other target groups or help to ensure the 
continued employment of workers at risk of involuntary job loss by covering 
some or all of the labour costs or reducing other costs associated with their 
employment.
What is the impact on employment? The main impact of employment incen-
tives is that it is less costly for employers to recruit individuals from the target 
group that might help to increase employment levels. The other impact, al-
though indirect but more important in the long run, is that it makes it possible 
for the target group to enter the labour market which might not be possible oth-
erwise due to their disadvantaged situation. During the course of employment 
the employee and the employer can get to know the skills of the employee and 
thus it might also have a lasting impact after the end of the support. The effect 
of employment incentives is largely dependent on market conditions and their 
actual regulation, particularly its targeting and “crowding-out” effect. O’Leary 
(1998) analysed the effect of wage subsidy schemes in Hungary over a decade 
ago and a similar analysis was carried out more recently by Csoba, Nagy and 
Szabó (2010) (see also Chapter 4 of In Focus). The authors concluded that the 
significant positive effect of wage subsidies was not primarily due to the de-
sign of the programs but to the fact that the participants had better than aver-
age employment prospects. To date there has been no empirical analysis of job 
retention support schemes in Hungary. The OECD (2009) expected that the 
measures used after the 2008 crisis would have a limited impact.
Situation in September 2010. There are many types of employment incen-
tives; the two main types are recruitment incentives and employment main-
tenance incentives. The measures include support towards the cost of labour 
(wage subsidy, wage and contributions subsidy, contribution reliefs including 
the Start, Start-extra, Start-plus and Start-region schemes as well), supports 
towards certain forms of working (for example tele-work), and supports reduc-
ing to the cost of working (different travel-to-work schemes). The measures are 
managed by job centres where the claims should also be submitted. However 
incentives can also take an indirect form (such as the Start-card).
Decreasing contribu-
tions for beneficiaris
Subsidies to encourage 
hiring and retention of 
jobs
The insTiTuTional environmenT...
193
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011.
– Starting from 2011 the Start-region was phased out. This could be used 
as part of the Start-extra scheme for recruiting workers claiming income re-
placement assistance. Supports awarded prior to January 1, 2011 are paid un-
til their expiry.
– As of January 1, 2011 part-time workers can also take part in Start-schemes.
– Restrictions were introduced on the entitlement conditions for the Start-
extra scheme in 2011: apart from the long-term unemployed only people aged 
over 50 years with a basic level education and who had been registered as job-
seekers for at least three months prior to enrolment in the scheme were enti-
tled to take part.
– Applications for new Start-plus and Start-extra cards had to be submitted 
at the latest by December 31, 2011 and employers are eligible for contribution 
relief until December 31, 2013.
Main legislation
The rules of employment incentive schemes are set out in Articles 11 and 18 
of Act 4 of 1991 (Employment Act), Articles 11 and 18 of MoL regulation no. 
6/1996. (16. 07), Government Regulation no. 39/1998. (04. 03) and Act 123 
of 2004 (“Start” Act).
New legislation: Government decree no. 1013/2011. (19. 01) on the Action 
Plan of the Social Renewal Operational Program for 2011–2013 that includes 
the detailed outline of Project SROP 1.2.1; Act 105 of 2011 on the Regula-
tory Alignment of Certain Labour Legislation and other Related Acts; Act 
106 of 2011 on Public Works and the Amendment of Public Works and other 
Related Legislation; MfNER regulation no. 27/2010. (31. 12) on the Amend-
ment of Certain MfNER Regulations in Relation to the Establishment of 
Government Offices.
On-line resources: http://www.munka.hu/engine.aspx?page=ma_tamogatas, 
http://www.munka.hu/engine.aspx?page=ak_tamogatasok, http://www.afsz.
hu/engine.aspx?page=full_tamop121
5. Sheltered employment and rehabilitation
How does it work? These measures aim to develop the existing work capacity 
of people with reduced work capacity by providing adaptations and adequate 
services and facilitate their return to work or continued employment.
What is the impact on employment? The primary aim of rehabilitation is to 
develop existing skills and competencies of people with reduced work capac-
ity that can prepare them to move on to work. It can also help to combat dis-
crimination arising from prejudice or lack of information. After successful re-
habilitation people can take up work on the open labour market or in special 
settings. If implemented adequately, rehabilitation can also increase the inde-
pendence of people with reduced work capacity, who can perform at the same 
Rehabilitation can pro-
mote the independence 
of people with reduced 
work capacity
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level as non-disabled workers, and this can increase the level of employment in 
the long run without increasing public expenditure. Scharle (2011) compared 
different forms of sheltered employment and rehabilitation in Hungary and 
found that the wage and other subsidies of sheltered workshops do not signifi-
cantly improve the employment prospects of participants while the rehabilita-
tion services of non-profit providers do.
How did it work previously? The distinction between sheltered employment 
and rehabilitation in Hungarian practice is as follows:
Sheltered employment: covers those sheltered work measures that have the 
aim of preparing people for integration into the open labour market: for ex-
ample the physical adaptation of the workplace, both building and equipment, 
or the provision of mentors or other specialist assistants.
Rehabilitation: covers measures providing guidance, training and develop-
ment that help participants to adjust to their disability or condition, develop 
competencies that prepare them to move on to work, and find and retain a 
suitable job and workplace.
Two types of organisations can provide sheltered employment in Hungary: 
sheltered workshops and accredited rehabilitation employers.6 It is a require-
ment for both types of organisations that a large proportion of their workforce 
has a reduced work capacity. The government provides two types of support 
towards the cost of rehabilitation: wage subsidy that can cover from 40 to 100 
per cent of the wage and contributions, and assistance to work placement, job 
retention, vocational rehabilitation and the provision of assistants at the work-
place. The other type of rehabilitation support is a cost reimbursement: the 
partial reimbursement of allowable and approved expenses directly related to 
the employment of people with reduced work capacity that the employer would 
not have incurred with the employment of non-disabled workers. This can be 
claimed by sheltered employers only. Job centres make the decision about the 
payment of rehabilitation wage subsidy.
Rehabilitation is supported via European Union programs and ad hoc grant 
programs for non-profit organisations. The SROP priority project 1.1.1 Pro-
moting the rehabilitation and employment of people with reduced work capac-
ity provides services and support to help labour market (re-)integration and 
job retention. The priority project is implemented by the public employment 
service. The process of rehabilitation is closely related to the payment of reha-
bilitation allowance that is paid for those with a 50–79% loss of work capac-
ity. This is discussed in more detail under heading 13 Old age and disability 
pensions – disability supports.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. The accreditation of 
employers of people with reduced work capacity was carried out by the Em-
ployment Office since its introduction (on November 1, 2005). As of January 
1, 2011 this, together with other activities related to the payment of public sub-
6 Accredited employers are those 
that have received a special ac-
creditation to employ people 
with reduced work capacity. 
There are different levels of ac-
creditation (basic or rehabili-
tation, and high level or condi-
tional).
Physical adaptations, 
workplace mentors
Wage subsidy and 
vocational rehabil-
itation subsidy
Priority projects are 
implemented by local 
offices of job centres
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sidies, has been the responsibility of the National Rehabilitation and Social 
Office (NRSO) together with other public bodies.
Main legislation
Government regulation no. 177/2005. (02. 09) on Public Subsidies for the 
Employment of Workers with Reduced Work Capacity; Ministry of Employ-
ment and Labour (MoEL) regulation no. 15/2005. (02. 09) on the Activities 
of the Employment Office in Relation to Rehabilitation; Government regu-
lation no. 176 /2005. (02. 09) on the Accreditation of Organisations Employ-
ing Workers with Reduced Work Capacity and the Inspection of Accredited 
Employers; and MoEL regulation no. 14/2005. (02. 09) on the Procedure and 
Requirements of the Accreditation Process.
New legislation: Government regulation no. 121/2011. (15. 07) Amending 
Government Regulation no. 177/2005. (02. 09) on Public Subsidies for the 
Employment of Workers with Reduced Work Capacity; Government regu-
lation no. 332/2010. (27. 12) Amending Certain Government Regulations 
in Relation to the Activities of the National Rehabilitation and Social Of-
fice; Ministry of National Resources (MoNR) regulation no. 46/2011. (15. 
07) Amending MoEL Regulation no. 15/2005. (02. 09) on the Assessment of 
Eligibility for Public Subsidy for the Employment of Workers with Reduced 
Work Capacity; MoNR regulation no. 25/2010. (30. 12) Amending Certain 
Ministerial Regulations in Relation to the Activities of the National Rehabili-
tation and Social Office.
On-line resources: http://www.munka.hu/engine.aspx?page=ma_
tamo ga tas &switch-content=ma_tamogatas_megvaltozott_mun ka-
kepz_091026&switch-zone=Zone1&switch-render-mode=full; http://www.
orszi.hu/html/pdf/tajekoztatok/Megvaltozott_munkakepesseguek_foglal-
koztatasanak_tamogatasa_2011.pdf
6. Direct job creation
How does it work? These programs create new jobs, usually of community 
benefit or socially useful, in order to create employment opportunities for the 
long-term unemployed or people who are otherwise struggling to find work. 
The jobs are usually in the public or non-profit sector, but projects of commu-
nity interest or similar within the private sector may also be eligible and no 
distinction should be made. Therefore this covers all forms of public works 
schemes – municipal and communal public works as well as centrally organ-
ised public works programs.
What is the impact on employment? The primary employment effect of direct 
job creation is that workers in non-market jobs are considered employed and 
count towards the employment rate. Nevertheless the indirect and possibly 
the most important effect of direct job creation might be that it provides an 
opportunity for people to enter the labour market. Labour market integration 
Jobs are created mainly 
in the public sector and 
in the non-profit sector
Criterion of success: la-
bour market integration
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is facilitated by adequate services and supports as well as the nature of work – 
among others by providing relevant work experience. O’Leary (1998) analysed 
the effect of public works schemes in Hungary over a decade ago and a similar 
analysis was carried out more recently by Csoba, Nagy and Szabó (2010) (see 
also Chapter 4 of In Focus). The Road to Work Program was examined by Bu-
dapest Institute and Hétfa (2011). None of these studies found a positive em-
ployment effect over the studied period.
Situation in September 2010. Until December 31, 2010 the public works 
scheme Road to Work was in effect. In this program participants were paid 
means-tested income maintenance assistance if they signed on as jobseekers 
with the jobcentre and were willing to accept job offers, including public works. 
There were also some municipal and centrally organised public works projects 
until the end of 2010.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. The previous system 
of public works was replaced by a completely new system in 2011. A new four-
pillar public works program replaced the three types of public works – cen-
trally organised, community and municipal public works. The four pillars 
are: short-term public works, longer term public works, mobility within pub-
lic works and nationwide public works programs.7 Employers can be – apart 
from the state – local councils, churches, social cooperatives and some speci-
fied businesses (water companies, forest management, national rail network). 
The program was overseen by the Ministry for National Economy in the first 
half of 2011, but from July 1, 2011 this was taken over by the Ministry of the 
Interior. As of September 1, 2011 the regulatory framework of public works 
were aligned with the conditions of unemployment assistance. A new type of 
employment relationship was created, the public works contract that removes 
participants of a public works program from the coverage of labour legislation 
in many aspects (such as the statutory minimum wage). The previous income 
maintenance assistance was replaced by the income maintenance assistance.
Different types of assistance are available for public works programs. Assis-
tance can be paid for short- and long-term and nationwide public works pro-
gram. Public interest agency work is also eligible for assistance if it employs 
people claiming income replacement assistance and also provides training and 
mentoring. In these cases the assistance equals to the amount of public works 
minimum wage. Furthermore, any employer recruiting workers claiming in-
come replacement assistance is eligible for assistance; these workers should be 
paid the statutory minimum wage and there is also a requirement of contin-
ued employment.
Main legislation
The status quo on December 31, 2010 was set out by Government regulation 
no. 23/2001 on Assistance for Public Works. The financial framework for 2011 
was defined by Act 169 of 2010 on the 2011 Budget of the Republic of Hungary.
7 The minister responsible for 
public works can launch pilot 
schemes for short term, longer 
term and national public works 
programs. Pilot schemes are im-
plemented in water management, 
agriculture, waste management 
(clearing up illegal waste dump-
ing sites), the maintenance of un-
paved roads used for agricultural 
purposes, road maintenance, 
winter employment.
Road to Work: public 
works programs
Four pillars of the new 
public works program
New type of employment 
contract: public works 
contract with public 
works wage
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New legislation: Rules after January 1, 2011 were laid down by Government 
regulation no. 375/2010 (31. 12) on Assistance for Public Works; rules after 
September 1, 2011 were defined by Act 106 of 2011 that also amended a number 
of other acts such as the Employment Act and Labour Code. Further rules can 
be found in: Government regulation no. 170/2011. (24. 08) on Wage Setting 
and Statutory Minimum Wage in Public Works and Government regulation 
no. 171/2011. (24. 08) on the Amendment of Certain Government Regula-
tions in Relation to Public Works.
On-line resources: http://www.munka.hu/engine.aspx?page=nfsz_kozfoglal-
koztatas
7. Start-up incentives
How does it work? Start-up measures provide financial support to promote 
entrepreneurship by encouraging the unemployed and other target groups to 
start their own business or to become self-employed.
What is the impact on employment? Unemployed people successfully starting 
their own business will reduce the unemployed count and increase the level 
of employment, potentially by employing others. According to the evaluation 
by O’Leary (1998) business start-up schemes significantly improved the labour 
market situation of participants. Galasi, Lázár and Nagy (2003) found the 
highest re-employment rates among participants of business start-up schemes. 
However results were explained by the more favourable than average charac-
teristics of beneficiaries.
Situation in September 2010. The target group of business start-up meas-
ures can include registered jobseekers and people claiming rehabilitation al-
lowance who become self-employed, set up a company or become an agricul-
tural producer.
The assistance can be paid as an interest-free non-repayable capital grant or re-
payable working capital loan and / or a non-repayable assistance up the amount 
of the statutory minimum wage and assistance towards the cost of business 
advisory services.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. The measure has been 
unchanged for years and there were no changes in this period either.
Main legislation
The measure is regulated by Article 17 of Act 4 of 1991 (Employment Act) 
and Article 10 of MoL regulation no. 6/1996. (16. 07).
On-line resources: http://www.munka.hu/engine.aspx?page=ak_tamoga-
tasok.
Business start-up can 
reduce the number of 
unemployed
Self-employment as a 
private entrepreneur, as 
part of a business corpo-
ration or as an agricul-
tural producer
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Supports
8. Unemployment (jobseeker’s) benefits
How does it work? Unemployment benefits and supports aim to compensate 
individuals for loss of wage or salary through the provision of cash benefits 
when a person is capable of working and available for work but is unable to 
find suitable employment. Entitlement to unemployment benefit is normally 
conditional upon the beneficiary actively seeking work but, in certain cases 
– for example older workers – the condition may be relaxed.
What is the impact on employment? People who lose their job usually face a 
loss of earnings for some months if they are not willing to take up a new job 
that is less favourable than the one they have just lost. The impact of unemploy-
ment benefit is not clearcut: on the one hand it provides out-of-work income 
that might reduce willingness to work. On the other hand adequate assistance 
– level and duration – allows more efficient job-search and thus reduces the du-
ration of unemployment, increases employment and leads to better job-match-
ing than in the absence of assistance. Galasi and Nagy (2002), Micklewright 
andNagy (1995), Köllő and Nagy (1995), Wolff (2001) wrote about the impact 
of unemployment benefit on employment. These studies showed that shorten-
ing the duration of the benefit period did not or only slightly increased labour 
supply while the financial situation of claimants deteriorated substantially.
Situation in September 2010. There were two types of benefit:
1. Unemployment assistance: is paid to (former) workers satisfying criteria 
for membership in an unemployment insurance scheme. It is often paid only 
for a limited period.
2. Unemployment assistance: is usually paid to workers who either fail to sat-
isfy criteria for membership in an unemployment insurance scheme (have not 
paid contributions for long enough) or who have exhausted insurance-based 
unemployment benefit entitlement. Unemployment assistance is normally 
means tested.
Between November 1, 2005 and August 31, 2011 there were three types of 
unemployment benefit and assistances. These were primarily insurance-based 
provisions with some means-tested elements. The public employment service 
was responsible for the administration of both supports. There was a gradu-
al shift towards the requirement of job search or as a minimum, cooperation 
with the job centre in the eligibility conditions for social assistance during the 
2000s, and this is still the case. Unemployment benefits are directly linked to 
the current public works scheme; they are managed by local councils that re-
quire claimants (apart from people claiming regular social assistance) to co-
operate with the employment service. The main characteristics of supports are 
summarised in Table 1.
Shortening the benefit 
period has only slightly 
increased labour supply 
but the financial situa-
tion of claimants got 
significantly worse
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table 1: main characteristics of jobseeker’s and working age benefits and supports between september 1, 2010 
and august 31, 2011*
Benefit Entitlement conditions Minimum Maximum
Jobseeker’s allowance
Phase 1 (half of the benefit 
period or up to 91 days)
A minimum of 365 days of contribution payment 
within the previous four years (employee, self-
employed, business owner who has paid business 
contribution)
Sixty per cent of taxable wage, 
no less than 60% of the statu-
tory minimum wage applicable 
on the first day of benefit pe-
riod: 46,800 HUF / month – 
1,560 HUF / day
Sixty per cent of taxable wage, 
no more than 120% of the 
statutory minimum wage ap-
plicable on the first day of 
benefit period: 93,600 HUF / 
month – 3,120 HUF / day
Phase 2 (the remaining ben-
efit period, up to 179 days)
More than 365 days of contribution payment 
within the previous four years
Sixty per cent of the statutory 
minimum wage applicable on 
the first day of benefit period: 
46,800 HUF / month – 1,560 
HUF / day
Jobseeker’s assistance
Type 1: 90 days; 180 days for 
people aged over 50
Entitled to Jobseeker’s Allowance for no less than 
180 day but has exhausted benefit entitlement 
and not found a job
Forty per cent of the minimum 
wage: 31,200 HUF / month – 
1,040 HUF / month
Type 2: 90 days Has been employed for 200–365 days within the 
previous four years.
Type 3: up to old age pension 
age but no more than five 
years
Within five years from old age pension age and 
has received Jobseeker’s Allowance for at least 
140 days but has exhausted benefit entitlement.
Income maintenance assis-
tance (until December 31, 
2010)
If more than one of the following apply: lack of 
job vacancies, low income, has exhausted entitle-
ment for Jobseeker’s Assistance, available to 
start work and willingness to cooperate with the 
job centre and accept suitable jobs in the previ-
ous year
The minimum amount of old 
age pension: 28,500 HUF / 
month
Income replacement assis-
tance (Between January 1 
and August 31, 2011)
Participation in work or labour market program 
for at least 30 days, willingness to accept any job.
Regular social assistance Reduced work capacity (long term condition, 
aged 55 or over, lack of suitable childcare for 
child(ren) aged under 14, other conditions as set 
out in the regulation) and on a low income (also 
do not have savings above a certain amount), 
exhausted entitlement to Jobseeker’s Assistance, 
not required to cooperate with the NES
Dependent on family income 
but up to the net full-time 
minimum wage (60,600 HUF / 
month)
* The amounts indicate rates applicable on August 31, 2011.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. The system of unemploy-
ment (jobseeker’s) benefits changed radically as of September 1, 2011: the higher 
amount and benefit period of Jobseeker’s Allowance was reduced significantly 
and there were also changes in the entitlement conditions. Type 1 (paid after 
Jobseeker’s Allowance) and Type 2 (200 days of employment) of Jobseeker’s As-
sistance were phased out. Entitlement conditions to Type 3 assistance changed 
and now it can be paid only to people within five years of old age pension age. 
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With the introduction of the new public works scheme social benefits changed 
too. The Income Replacement Assistance was replaced by Out-of-work Assis-
tance with stricter entitlement conditions. The characteristics and rates of new 
jobseeker’s and social supports as of September 1, 2011 are presented in Table 2.
table 2: main characteristics of jobseeker’s and other working age supports as of 
september 1, 2011
Benefit Entitlement conditions Amount
Jobseeker’s Allowance 
(benefit period minimum 
36, maximum 90 days)
Paid contributions for at least 360 days 
within the previous five years, a 10-day 
contribution period corresponds to one day 
benefit period.
Sixty per cent of the taxable wage, 
up to 100% of the statutory mini-
mum wage effective on the first day 
of benefit period: 78,000 HUF / 
month – 2,600 HUF / day
Pre-pension Jobseeker’s 
Assistance
Within five years from old age pension age 
and has received Jobseeker’s Allowance for 
at least 90 days but has exhausted benefit 
entitlement within the previous three years, 
has enough qualifying years for old age 
pension
Forty per cent of the statutory 
minimum wage: 31,200 HUF / 
month – 1,040 HUF / day
Out-of-work Assistance Eligible for working age assistance, except 
those eligible for regular social assistance. 
Participation in work or labour market 
program for at least 30 days, willingness to 
accept any job and keeps living environ-
ment clean if required by the local council
The minimum amount of old age 
pension: 28,500 HUF / month
Regular social assistance No change Dependent on family income but 
up to the net full-time minimum 
wage (60,600 HUF / month)
* Entitlement to benefits can be gained through employment, self-employment or busi-
ness ownership provided they satisfied the requirement of paying unemployment 
contributions.
Main legislation
Unemployment benefits are set out in Chapter 5 of Act 4 of 1991 (Employ-
ment Act) and Article 25.1 of Act 3 of 1993 on Social Administration and So-
cial Provisions. Social assistance is regulated by Act 3 of 1993 and Government 
regulation no. 63/2006. (27. 03) on Detailed Rules for Claiming, Awarding 
and Paying Cash and In-Kind Benefits.
New legislation: Act 106 of 2011 on Public Works and the Amendment of 
Public Works and other Related Legislation.
On-line resources: http://www.munka.hu/engine.aspx?page =allas kere-
soknek_munkanelkuli_ellatasok
9. Early retirement
How does it work? These programs facilitate the full or partial early retirement 
of older workers who are assumed to have little chance of finding a job or whose 
retirement facilitates the placement of an unemployed person or a person from 
Partial early retirement 
for those whose chances of 
re-employment are small
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another target group. This does not include pension paid to beneficiaries over 
the standard retirement age as established in the reference pension scheme or 
pre-retirement pension that is discussed in more detail under Old age pensions.
What is the impact on employment? Although conditional early retirement 
increases the level of inactivity the obligation to replace a retiree reduces un-
employment in the short run. This measure has not been studied in Hungary, 
however analysing the long-term effect of early retirement Layard, Nickell 
and Jackman (1991) concluded that if it is used extensively its short-term effect 
soon disappears through wage adjustment and unemployment increases again.
Situation in September 2010. This measure no longer exists in Hungary, it 
is mentioned here as a matter of interest. (Previously the early pension was a 
similar measure.) Two types of early retirement:
1. Conditional early retirement: facilitates the early retirement of older work-
ers and obliges the employer to replace the retiree with an unemployed person 
or a person from another target group.
2. Unconditional early retirement: facilitates the early retirement of older per-
sons and, for those retiring from employment, where there is no obligation for 
the employer to replace the retiree. Unconditional early retirement supports 
can only be included when they offer benefits due to unemployment or to job 
reduction caused by economic measures such as the restructuring of an indus-
trial sector or of a business enterprise.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. No changes in this 
area.
Mixed interventions (complex programs)
Mixed interventions encompass the joint and synergic application of more than 
one of the above measure and support. They are distinguished from a simple 
combination of measures by using the potential synergies of different meas-
ures that enhance their positive effect.
The main building blocks of mixed interventions are the labour market pol-
icy measures presented above; so at least the same measure-specific effects can 
be expected. However in well-designed mixed interventions the components 
enhance each other’s effects. This might also mean that measures which have 
no effect or negative effect on their own, might have a positive effect as part 
of a mixed intervention. Evaluation studies of labour market policies often 
point out that isolated programs are not effective (enough). However, a com-
mon conclusion is that well-designed complex programs can potentially be ef-
fective in cases where individual measures failed to achieve any results (Kézdi 
and Hudomiet, 2008). The impact of complex programs in Hungary has not 
yet been studied.
The most important complex programs of the studied period were co-fi-
nanced by the EU within the framework of the Social Renewal Operational 
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Program (SROP). These were SROP 1.1.1 (Promoting the Rehabilitation and 
Employment of People with Reduced Work Capacity) and SROP 1.1.2/1.1 (De-
centralised Programs for the Employment of Disadvantaged People in the Con-
vergence Regions / Promoting the Employment of Disadvantaged People in the 
Central Hungary Region) and SROP 1.1.3 (Road to the World of Work). SROP 
project 1.1.1 supports people with reduced work capacity, project 1.1.2 and pro-
ject 1.1.4 supports young entrants, people aged 50 years or over, low-educated 
and returning to work after having a child / children. The only target group of 
project 1.1.3 are registered jobseekers receiving social assistance (i.e. income 
maintenance assistance and later income replacement assistance).
The participants of SROP program 1.1.1 can chose services and supports from 
a range of measures that support training, work experience and work practice 
through supported employment, work trials, and self-employment. These are 
accompanied by supports and services that help the rehabilitation and improve 
the employability and adaptability of participation. The direct objective of 
SROP program 1.1.2 is to support the labour market entry of disadvantaged 
people using mixed interventions that are tailored to individual characteris-
tics and local opportunities and demands. The program started on January 1, 
2008 and ended on April 30, 2011. After April 20, 2009 jobseekers who had 
lost their job as a result of the economic recession also became eligible to enrol. 
The program was re-launched on May 1, 2011 including new target groups such 
as people claiming income replacement assistance and out-of-work assistance.
Participants of SROP programs, 1.1.2, 1.1.3 and 1.1.4 can access the whole 
range of LMP measures, and they are also eligible to receive a reimbursement 
of their expenditures (e.g. travel costs) to access the selected services. However 
in some cases there is no synergy between the individual program components.
Main legislation
SROP priority projects 1.1.1, 1.1.2 and 1.1.4 are set out in Government de-
cree no. 1013/2011. (19. 01) on the Action Plan of the Social Renewal Opera-
tional Program for 2011–2013
Labour market reLated poLIcy measures
Labour markets are also influenced indirectly by measures other than labour 
market / employment policies – for example by the tax system that influences 
the price of labour. The definition of these indirect measures is based on a sim-
plified, but still comparable, version of the LABREF database.
10. Labour taxation
Tax system
What is the impact on employment? Taxes influence prices on the labour mar-
ket and they directly reduce the income of the affected parties. The extent of 
Main complex programs 
with EU funding – 
SROP
Corporate incomes and 
labour taxation
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this is usually dependent on the wage elasticity of labour demand and supply, 
which is influenced by the distribution of the tax burden between the em-
ployer and the employee, as well as the taxes influencing the revenue of the 
company at the given output. This chapter considers corporate taxes and tax-
es on labour. Income tax increases the wage cost and reduces the net income 
that in turn reduces demand for labour. The tax rate on labour and capital 
influences their share in production. Not only the rate but the structure of 
income tax is important: the different tax burden on certain groups can in-
fluence the structure of the labour supply. As an indirect labour market effect, 
it can be expected that services financed from tax revenues contribute to the 
operation of the economy including the labour market, for example by pro-
viding adequate infrastructure and public services. If there is no substantive 
relationship between taxation and public services, then tax morale declines 
and undeclared employment rises. It is important to note that work can be 
remunerated in many ways and many of these are exempt from corporation 
and income tax: for example business income that is not paid out, simplified 
business tax or the income of some primary producers in agriculture. Many 
of these are relevant in employment but are not discussed here.
Scharle et al. (2010) considered the effect of taxes on labour supply. The la-
bour demand of the business sector according to industries was discussed by 
Kőrösi (2005) and according to education levels by Kertesi and Köllő (2002). 
Bakos, Benczúr and Benedek (2008) analysed the impact of income reporting, 
however it was not possible to separate the impact of labour supply and under-
reporting of income. The general finding of these studies was that both the 
price and elasticity of labour demand was similar to those in developed market 
economies, and among high earners a medium wage elasticity of labour supply 
was measured (that could not be separated from the effect of income reporting).
Situation in September 2010. The corporation tax is payable on the taxable 
revenue of the company and its rate was 10% up to 250 million forints and 
19% above that (effective from July 1, 2010). In economic terms the taxable 
revenue is the company’s profit, the exact definition is laid out in the law. The 
self-employed and corporations can also opt for the simplified business tax. 
Its rate is 30% of the turnover and it redeems all other taxes. The tax on sav-
ing interests is 20%.
There were two personal income tax rates in 2010 and the taxable income was 
based on the so-called “semi supergross” income (127% of the pre-tax wage) 
that is the total amount of the pre-tax wage and employee contributions. In-
come tax rates and tax-brackets are as follows: 21.6% for an annual income 
up to 3,937 million forints (17% of the taxable income), and 40.6% includ-
ing additional tax on incomes above that (32% of the taxable income with-
out that). People earning less than 3,188 million forints per year are entitled 
to write off 15,100 forints per month from their pre-tax wage which reduces 
Dual-rate taxation 
in 2010
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the effective lower tax rate. This is gradually reduced up to an annual income 
of 4,698 million forints, which is the upper limit for this allowance. There are 
various income tax reliefs, but their extent does not significantly influence the 
tax burden for the majority of taxpayers.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. Corporate tax and 
income tax changed in 2011. There are still two rates for corporate tax, but the 
tax bracket for the 10% rate were extended to 500 million forints, and above 
this the tax rate is 19%. Thus the tax burden of employers with taxable revenue 
between 250 and 500 million forints nearly halved. The tax on saving inter-
est was reduced to 16%.
There were important changes in the system of personal income tax. First, 
the two rates were replaced by a single rate that is 20.3% of the pre-tax wage 
(16% of the taxable income). Moreover, families with children receive consid-
erable tax relief: families with one child / two children can write off 62,500 
forints, families with three or more children 206,240 forints per month from 
their taxable income. The relief can be shared by both parents so it might auto-
matically reduce the tax burden of the second earner just returning to work.8 
The amount that can be written off the taxable income by lower earners was 
reduced to 12,110 forints per month and can be used up to an annual taxable 
income of 2.75 million forints and then it is gradually reduced up to an an-
nual income of 3.96 million forints. Thus, changes have a mixed effect. First, 
the nominal tax rate was reduced slightly in the previous lower tax bracket and 
significantly in the previous upper tax bracket. Second, reducing the amount 
that can be written off the taxable income by lower earners increases their ef-
fective tax rate, which ultimately increases their tax burden. Third, the income 
tax of families with children decreased significantly regardless of the effect of 
the above changes, and if their taxable income is large enough they might not 
even have to pay income tax.
Apart from changes to taxation, the rules of simplified employment were re-
viewed too. People who work under the terms of simplified employment need 
to fill in a tax return form and pay income tax only if they had other sources of 
taxable income or their total annual income was more than 840,000 forints.
Main legislation
Corporation tax: Act 81 of 1996; personal income tax: Act 117 of 1995
New legislation: Amendment of Tax Law: Act 123 of 2010; Amendment of 
Simplified Employment: Act 75 of 2010
On-line resources: http://www.apeh.hu/adokulcsok_jarulekmertekek/fize-
tendo_jar
Contributions
What is the impact on employment? Contributions, similarly to taxes, influ-
ence prices on the labour market and reduce the income of the affected parties. 
8 It is important to note that the 
discount can be used jointly by 
both parents therefore it does 
not create a gap between the 
marginal tax rate of first and 
second earners (for example 
parents returning to work after 
caring for children) over a broad 
income range.
Income tax reliefs and 
tax credits
Link between contribution 
payment and services re-
ceived – motivation
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Their effect is similar to that of taxes (see description above). As an indirect 
labour market effect it can be expected that systems financed by contribution 
payments help to maintain and improve the work capacity of the population. 
Also, personalised future entitlements based on contribution payments might 
enhance willingness to pay compared to taxes as the use of tax revenues is more 
difficult to trace. However, if there is no clear relationship between contribu-
tion payments and the services received, then undeclared work or different 
employment statuses (business owner, subcontractor, consultancy, simplified 
employment etc.) become more common, particularly for second jobs.
Situation in September 2010: The rates of employer’s and employee’s contri-
butions in 2010 are summarised in Table 3.
table 3: employer’s and employee’s contribution as a percentage of pre-tax wages
Per cent
Contributions paid by employers
Social security contribution
Pension contribution 24.0
Health care and labour 
market contribution
Health care services 1.5
Health benefits 0.5
Labour market contribution 1.0
Pre-retirement pension contri-
bution*
13.0
Contributions paid by employees
Pension contribution** 9.5
Health care and labour market 
contribution
Health care services 4.0
Health benefits 2.0
Labour market contribution 1.5
* Twenty-five per cent of the pre-retirement pension contribution is paid by the state 
budget, therefore employers and self-employed pay only 9.75%. This contribution is 
paid only by people employed in certain professions.
** Contributions paid by members and non-members of voluntary pension funds are 
not shown separately.
Source: adapted from nav.hu.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. With the reform of 
the pension system as of January 1, 2011 the previously separate statutory con-
tributions (paid from the pre-tax wage of earners) to the state and private pen-
sion pillars were replaced by a single contribution. The rate increased from a 
combined 9.5% to 10% and contributions paid from other incomes – simplified 
employment, simplified business tax – increased accordingly too. There were 
no other changes, previous rates and taxable bands remain in effect.
In a separate reform, the rules of simplified employment changed to allow 
the payment of a flat-rate contribution – 500 or 1,000 forints per day. If some-
body only works in simplified employment, they are not insured but they qual-
ify for a pension, health provision for work-related accidents and unemploy-
ment assistance.
Single pension 
contribution
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Main legislation
The pension system, including payment of all types of contributions and eli-
gibility for private pension are set out in Act 80 of 1997, the simplified busi-
ness tax is set out in Act 120 of 2005 on simplified contribution payments.
New legislation: pension reform: Act 100 of 2010 on the Freedom of Choice 
of Pension Funds; Act 101 of 2010 on the Amendment of Certain Laws on Pri-
vate Pension Contributions; simplified employment: Act 75 of 2010; Changes 
in Contribution Rates: Act 123 of 2010 on the Amendment of Tax Law and 
Accounting Law.
On-line resources: http://www.apeh.hu/adokulcsok_jarulekmertekek/fize-
tendo_jar
11. Other transfers
Means-tested social assistance
What is the impact on employment? Means-tested social cash benefits re-
duce labour supply in two ways. First, they provide an income without work; 
although this is a disincentive to work but it is in accordance with their aims. 
However, their perverse effect is that they impose a high tax on earnings around 
the means testing limits and can lead to welfare trap – for more on this see 
Semjén (1996) and Cseres-Gergely and Scharle (2008). Social transfers that in-
fluence prices or can only be spent on certain goods interfere with individual 
choice that might also be related to the labour market. This distortion can be 
explicit (for example cooked meal vouchers can increase demand for cooked 
meals), a direct side effect (for example instead of the provision of social hous-
ing supporting house building and home ownership might reduce geographi-
cal mobility) or an indirect side effect (for example if transport capacities are 
limited the universal and unlimited free travel of old age pensioners can create 
obstacles for travelling to work).
Situation in September 2010. The number of social benefits in Hungary is 
very high – there are approximately 350 different types of assistance available 
(see Cseres-Gergely et al., 2009). These are typically limited in scope and they 
have a moderate labour market impact. Two main types of transfers that have 
significant impact on the labour market, child care benefits and regular social 
assistance – increasingly becoming integrated into the unemployment assis-
tance system – are discussed separately.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. There were no signifi-
cant changes in minor transfers, but changes in housing assistance might be 
worth highlighting. Previously housing assistance could only be used to pay 
for winter fuel but as of September 1, 2011 it can also be used to pay for rent, 
utility bills and other housing related costs.
Main legislation
Act 3 of 1993 on Social Administration and Social Provisions.
Direct and indirect ef-
fects of social transfers
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New legislation: Act 171 of 2010 Amending Certain Social, Child Protec-
tion, Family Benefits and Disability-Related Acts.
Child care benefits
What is the impact on employment? The labour market effect of cash benefits 
– similarly to other social assistance – reduces labour supply in the target group. 
However, benefits related to the number of qualifying years can increase will-
ingness to work before claiming the assistance. The primary effect of these ben-
efits is that they can reduce child poverty and that has an indirect employment 
effect: reducing future labour market disadvantages (this is a strong effect but it 
develops over a very long term, see for example Carneiro and Heckman [2003]). 
The impact of cash benefits on the labour market was discussed by Bálint and 
Köllő (2008). They found that cash benefits had a negative impact on the em-
ployment prospects of mothers returning to work and they also hampered 
the trend of wage increase that started at the beginning of their career. Non-
cash assistance, on the contrary, improves labour market prospects for women.
Situation in September 2010. The main child care provisions can be grouped 
into three categories (Table 4). The first group includes benefits that provide 
an income replacement during times when labour market participation is lim-
ited: these include the maternity benefit, child care allowance (depending on 
the legislation in force), child care pay and child care assistance. The second 
group includes assistance that rewards labour market participation: these are 
different forms of tax credits and reliefs. The third group includes assistance 
targeted at families that are not linked to labour market status: such as the fam-
ily benefit and the child care allowance (depending on the legislation in force). 
Maternity benefit and child care pay are the highest amount, while child care 
allowance, child care assistance and family benefit are paid at lower rates but 
for a longer period. Their primary target group is expectant mothers, mothers 
who have just given birth or are caring for children, therefore they are mainly 
affected by their secondary effects (except for the family benefit).9 The amount 
and importance of tax credits is limited but they have a wider target group that 
includes fathers and mothers as well.
The most important child care service is nursery provision for which all chil-
dren under three are eligible however its availability is extremely limited.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. There were various 
changes in the system of child care assistance after January 1, 2011. Firstly, child 
care allowance and child care assistance regulations that entered into force 
on May 1, 2010 were abolished with a retroactive effect and previous benefit 
periods were restored. These benefits did not rise in 2011 compared to their 
2010-level. The family benefit was split into two benefits: child benefit and 
schooling benefit (for children of compulsory school age). In the latter case if 
parents fail to make sure that their children receive school education and at-
9 Both child care allowance and 
child care pay can be claimed by 
fathers and grandparents, al-
though their take-up is minimal: 
according to the CSO’s Labour 
Force Survey 2.4% of people re-
ceiving child care allowance and 
1.2% of recipients of child care 
pay were men.
Can reduce child 
poverty and future 
labour market dis-
advantages
Parental leave and 
family benefits
The amount of benefits 
will not increase, tax 
credits given a more 
prominent role
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tend school regularly they might lose their eligibility for the benefit. A strong 
emphasis was placed on tax credits and reliefs that increased significantly more 
than other provisions. There were no changes in the availability or eligibility 
for nursery provision. The possibility to take up paid work while receiving 
child care allowance was restricted to 30 hours per week or full-time if work-
ing from home, while people claiming child care assistance can now work up 
to 30 hours compared to 20 hours previously.
table 4: main child care provisions in september 2010
Maternity 
assistance Maternity benefit
Child care 
allowance Child care pay
Child care assis-
tance Family benefit
Family tax 
credit Nursery
Entitle-
ment 
condi-
tions
Legal 
residency 
in Hungary, 
at least 
four ante-
natal care 
visits
Previous contribu-
tion payment: 180 
days within the two 
years before claim-
ing the benefit for 
claims before May 
1, 2010, 365 days 
for claims after 
that. Paid during 
maternity leave, up 
to 168 days
Universal 
entitlement 
after May 1, 
2010, paid up 
to the second 
birthday of the 
child, previ-
ously until the 
third birthday
Previous contri-
bution pay-
ment: 180 days 
within the two 
years before 
claiming the 
benefit for 
claims before 
May 1, 2010, 
365 days for 
claims after 
that.
Universal entitle-
ment, for parents 
caring for 3 or 
more children. As 
of May 1, 2010 it 
can be claimed 
from the second 
(previously third) 
birthday of the 
youngest child 
until the child 
reaches 8
Caring for a child or 
young person – own 
or adopted – aged 
under 20
Caring for at 
least three 
children, tax-
able band 
dependent on 
number of 
children (three 
children: 
8,580,7000 
forints; seven 
children: 
12,400,000 
forints)
Universal entitle-
ment for children 
aged 0–3; eligibil-
ity: mother is not 
claiming child 
care pay and there 
are places avail-
able locally. Local 
councils with more 
than 10,000 
inhabitants are 
obliged to provide 
nursery
Rate One-off flat 
rate pay-
ment, 
225% of 
the mini-
mum state 
pension 
(64,125 
forints in 
2010)
Paid according to 
rules on sick leave 
but only if there is 
a loss of income. 
Seventy per cent of 
the daily average 
wage in the year 
before the child is 
born; no upper 
limit applies
At the rate of 
minimum state 
pension 
(28,500 forints 
in 2010 and 
2011). Flat-
rate, does not 
depend on the 
number of 
children except 
for twins.
Seventy per 
cent of the 
daily average 
wage in the 
year before the 
child is born, 
up to twice the 
statutory mini-
mum wage
At the rate of 
minimum state 
pension (28,500 
forints in 2010 
and 2011). Flat-
rate, does not 
depend on the 
number of chil-
dren except for 
twins
The amount increas-
es with the number of 
children. 12,200 
forints a month for 
one child, 14,800 
forints per child for 
three or more chil-
dren. Higher amounts 
for children with long 
term condition and 
single parents.
4,000 forints 
per child and 
per month, 
amount de-
pendent on 
total income –
Other 
advan-
tages
– Qualifies for social 
security benefits
Qualifies for 
social security 
benefits
Qualifies for 
social security 
benefits
Qualifies for 
social security 
benefits
– – –
Work 
permitted
Not appli-
cable
Not permitted Not permitted 
until the first 
birthday of 
child, no re-
strictions 
afterwards
Not permitted 
except for work 
under intellec-
tual property 
rights
Up to 20 hours 
per week or no 
restriction if 
working from 
home
Not applicable Not applicable 
(but it can only 
be used if 
paying income 
tax)
Due to limited 
capacities it is 
often a de facto 
requirement and 
proof of contract 
of employment is 
required
Other 
condi-
tions
Various exemp-
tions, special 
conditions
– – – – – –
Related 
expenses – – – –
Non-taxable but 
taken into account 
when calculating 
taxable income
–
Financial contribu-
tion often required 
from parents
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table 5: main child care provisions in september 2011
Maternity 
assistance
Maternity 
benefit
Child care 
allowance
Child care 
pay
Child care 
assistance Family benefit
Family tax 
credit Nursery
Entitle-
ment 
condi-
tions
Legal resi-
dency in 
Hungary, at 
least four 
antenatal 
care visits
Previous con-
tribution pay-
ment: 365 
days within the 
two years 
before claim-
ing the benefit. 
Paid during 
maternity 
leave, up to 
168 days.
Universal 
entitlement, 
until the child 
reaches 3
Previous 
contribution 
payment: 365 
days within 
the two years 
before claim-
ing the ben-
efit
Universal 
entitlement, 
for parents 
caring for 3 or 
more children, 
from the third 
birthday of the 
youngest child 
until the child 
reaches 8.
Caring for a child or 
young person – own 
or adopted – aged 
under 20
Caring for a 
child or chil-
dren
Universal entitle-
ment for children 
aged 0–3; eligibil-
ity: mother is not 
claiming child 
care pay and 
there are places 
available locally. 
Local councils 
with more than 
10,000 inhabit-
ants are obliged 
to provide nursery
Rate One-off flat 
rate payment, 
225% of the 
minimum 
state pen-
sion (64,125 
forints in 
2011)
Paid according 
to rules on 
sick leave but 
only if there is 
a loss of in-
come. Seventy 
per cent of the 
daily average 
wage in the 
year before the 
child is born; 
no upper limit 
applies.
At the rate of 
minimum state 
pension 
(28,500 forints 
in 2010 and 
2011). Flat-
rate, does not 
depend on the 
number of 
children ex-
cept for twins.
Seventy per 
cent of the 
daily average 
wage in the 
year before 
the child is 
born, up to 
twice the 
statutory 
minimum 
wage
At the rate of 
minimum state 
pension 
(28,500 forints 
in 2010 and 
2011). Flat-
rate, does not 
depend on the 
number of 
children ex-
cept for twins.
The amount in-
creases with the 
number of children. 
12,200 forints a 
month for one child, 
14,800 forints per 
child for three or 
more children. 
Higher amounts for 
children with long 
term condition and 
single parents.
Amount can be 
written-off 
from taxable 
income: first 
and second 
child 62,500 
forints per 
child per 
month, from 
third child 
upwards 
206,250 for-
ints per month
–
Other 
advan-
tages
–
Qualifies for 
social security 
benefits
Qualifies for 
social security 
benefits
Qualifies for 
social secu-
rity benefits
Qualifies for 
social security 
benefits
– – –
Work 
permitted
Not applica-
ble
Not permitted Not permitted 
until the first 
birthday of 
child, up to 30 
hours after 
that or no 
restrictions if 
working from 
home
Not permitted 
except for 
work under 
intellectual 
property 
rights
Up to 30 hours 
per week or no 
restriction if 
working from 
home
Not applicable 
(but it can only 
be used if 
paying income 
tax)
Due to limited 
capacities it is 
often a de facto 
requirement and 
proof of contract 
of employment is 
required
Other 
condi-
tions –
Various exemp-
tions, special 
conditions
For children of 
compulsory school 
age the benefit can 
be withdrawn or 
paid in kind if fails 
to attend school
–
Related 
expenses –
Taxable but no 
contribution 
payment is 
required
– – –
Non-taxable but 
taken into account 
when calculating 
taxable income
–
Financial contri-
bution often 
required from 
parents
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Main legislation
Social assistance is set out in Act 3 of 1993, taxes in Act 117 of 1995, contri-
butions and qualifying for pensions in Act 80 of 1997. For child care provisions 
see Act 31 of 1997, for family supports see Act 84 of 1998.
New legislation: Act 171 of 2010.
12. Contracts of employment, labour law
What is the impact on employment? The impact of labour law can range from 
simply defining employment relationships to shifting the balance of bargain-
ing power on the labour market. A legal framework that gives strong rights 
to employees over wage settlement, not only protects from employers but also 
provides more security for workers who are more embedded in the structures 
of the labour market. A more permissive regulation on the other hand favours 
“outsiders” and employers. Labour law does not extend to illegal employment 
so stricter conditions might push workers who are unwilling to commit them-
selves to a formal employment relationship towards undeclared work. Hun-
gary ranked 11th on the OECD’s employment protection index: with a score 
of 1.82 compared to the OECD average of 2.11, Poland’s 2.01, Slovakia’s 2.45 
and the Czech Republic’s 3.0 value (lower scores indicating more flexibility). 
We have no information about the impact of the legal environment but we can 
draw some conclusions based on the behaviour of the labour market – Kőrösi 
(2005) suggested that its flexibility was average by international comparison. 
Horváth and Szalai (2008) analysed the flexibility of the Hungarian labour 
market and they concluded that inflexibility was not the result of the institu-
tional structure but the low probability of transition between labour market 
statuses and weaknesses of institutions supporting this transition.
Situation in September 2010. Labour law is highly complex; its discussion 
would go beyond the scope of this chapter. One of the main features of labour 
law is that a different set of rules apply for private and public sector employment 
– and within this for public sector workers and civil servants. These rules cover 
the majority of lawfully employed workers: out of the 3.781 million workers 
in 2010, 3,317 worked 60 hours or more a week (CSO Stadat), the majority of 
them all year round. Various studies put the extent of undeclared work at around 
15% of total employment (e.g. Elek et al., 2009) and the protection of labour 
law does not extend to them. At the same time in some groups of workers the 
number of seasonal workers, workers with second jobs and domestic workers is 
above the average and atypical forms of employment, part time work and agency 
work are increasing rapidly. Simplified employment is a distinct legal category.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. The government re-
viewed the regulation of simplified employment. The use of this form of em-
ployment is limited by activity, frequency of work and size of the employer. 
In the case of simplified employment the general rules on working time, paid 
Flexible regulation 
according to OECD’s 
Employment Protec-
tion Index
Separate legislation for 
the business sector and 
the public sector
Reviewing the regulation 
of simplified employment
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leave, agency work, sick leave and reference period. However according to the 
reviewed regulation pay should be no less than the statutory minimum wage – 
this was not explicit in the previous regulation. The amendment of the labour 
code entered into force in the first half of 2011. It is worth highlighting some 
of the changes: the default length of the probationary period is 30 days, this 
can be extended to three months in a contract of employment or to six months 
in a collective agreement; new rules allow more flexibility in setting the week-
ly reference period and without changes in the wage. Paid leave became more 
flexible and temporary agency work was defined more clearly emphasising the 
temporary nature of work and the obligation of equal pay for work of equal 
value. There were also changes in the strike law that created an obligation to 
provide a satisfactory service during strikes in sectors of key importance. This 
includes utility companies and public transport companies.
It is very important because it will probably affect many people that special 
rules apply for public works participants in a number or areas as of September 
1, 2011 as a result of the integration of public works into labour market and so-
cial provisions. Notably permanent contracts of employment will no longer be 
the standard in public works however there is no probationary period and assis-
tance should be offered with travel to work or accommodation if further away.
Main legislation
Act 22 of 1992 (Labour Code), Act 33 of 1992 on the Legal Status of Public 
Sector Workers, Act 23 of 1992 on the Legal Status of Civil Servants.
New legislation: Act 75 of 2010 on Simplified Employment and Government 
regulation no. 223/2010 on the Implementing of Regulations of the Act; Ag-
riculture: Government regulation no. 218/2011 on Simplified Employment; 
Act 178 of 2011 on Strike Action; Act 105 of 2011 on the Regulatory Align-
ment of Certain Labour Legislation and Other Related Acts.
13. Old age and disability pension – disability assistance
Old age pension
What is the impact on employment? Pensions, similarly to benefits, provide 
an income without actual work for eligible people and thus depending on its 
elasticity reduces labour supply. The extent of the reduction in labour supply 
depends, among other things, on the size of the pension (or often its relative 
size to potential earnings from work). The timing of this effect depends on the 
entitlement conditions, mainly the pension age. If the pension age is low from 
a labour market perspective and people can retire without a penalty (malus) 
then the pension system might cause disruptions: if people can retire “too early” 
and with “too favourable” conditions then people who are otherwise capable 
of working will exit the labour market. Withdrawal from the labour market 
might be encouraged by a secure income without work or there might be legal 
restrictions on work.
Special rules for public 
works programs
“Too early” and “too 
good” conditions en-
courage the early exit 
of people who are capa-
ble of working
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An indirect labour market effect might be that old age security might reduce 
willingness to save. If there is no substantive relationship between the amount 
of pension contributions and the size of pension (or the worker does not see this 
relationship), then the worker might try to avoid the burden of contribution 
payment and work illegally or if it is a secondary income, finds legal alternatives, 
for example operates as a business. Finally, some special pension arrangements 
can have further effects: it can be part of the remuneration package offered to 
the worker and provide further incentives to accept inconveniences of certain 
jobs and thus facilitate the filling of these positions. Cseres-Gergely (2008) ana-
lysed the labour market effect of the main characteristics of the pension system 
in Hungary and found that both the availability and the replacement rate of 
pensions had a significant impact on the likelihood of retirement.
Situation in September 2010. During most of 2010 the pension system com-
prised of three “pillars”: the first pillar the pay-as-you-go state pillar, the second 
pillar the compulsory private pension fund and the third pillar the voluntary 
private pension fund. Contribution to the first two pillars was obligatory; par-
ticipation in the third pillar as well as the amount of contribution was volun-
tary. Compulsory pension contributions have been discussed in the section on 
Taxation above. The increase of pensions during payment is set by the govern-
ment based on a combination of price and wage increases. The rate of increase 
was set in 2010 as the average of consumer price index and wage increase if the 
growth of GDP is 3.5% or above. However, if the growth rate of GDP is smaller 
than this, pensions are increased according to the consumer price index. Com-
pulsory private pensions have not yet been paid and annual increases of private 
pensions are not regulated.
People are entitled to old age pension if they reach a certain age and have 
enough qualifying years. The starting pension is calculated according to a for-
mula that is primarily based on post-1988 employment history. There are no 
eligibility conditions attached to the payment of old age pensions. Pre-pensions 
can be paid at a reduced rate if the claimant does not have enough qualifying 
years. Nevertheless the regulations set fairly general conditions and as a result 
the majority of workers retire before the nominal state pension age without 
reducing the amount of their pension. People receiving pre-pension are only 
permitted a limited amount of work: if their annual earnings exceed 18 times 
the statutory minimum wage the payment of pension must be suspended un-
til they reach state pension age.
Different from the pre-pension is the pre-retirement pension that can be 
paid to people in hazardous or dangerous jobs. For these workers there are 
job-specific pension ages that should not be considered as exceptions but are 
part of their work contract.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. There were funda-
mental changes in the pension system in the autumn of 2010 and these were 
The link between pen-
sion contribution and 
actual pension should 
be clear
Three pillars: pay as you 
go public, compulsory 
private pension and vol-
untary private pension
Two pillars instead 
of three
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particularly unfavourable for people contributing to compulsory private pen-
sion funds. As of January 1, 2011 members of these funds have been obligated 
to pay the full contribution to the state pension pillar but this does not count 
as a qualifying period for them. Although they were given the opportunity to 
leave the private pension fund and return to the state-only system where their 
contributions are used in full. As a result of these changes the second pillar 
basically ceased to exist, there were only about 100,000 members left and no 
new membership is possible. As of January 2011 women can retire regardless 
of their age if they have enough qualifying years and no longer pay social se-
curity contributions. The number of qualifying years required to retire is re-
duced by one year for five children and by a further year for each additional 
child up to seven years.
Main legislation
Act 81 of 1997 on social security pensions.
New legislation: Act 154 of 2010 on Changes in the Second Pillar; Act 170 
of 2010 on the Amendment of Certain Pension Related Acts and Related 
Laws (this includes changes in pension entitlement for women). Government 
regulation no. 353/2010 on Pension and Accident-Related Pension Increases.
On-line resources: http://www.onyf.hu.
Disability pension – disability provision
What is the impact on employment? Disability pension, similarly to old age 
pension and benefits provide an income without work and thus reduce labour 
supply as well as the number of hours worked. Its indirect effects are similar to 
those of the old age pension but probably more limited because it is less likely 
to happen. The size of its effect strongly depends on its availability and amount. 
Scharle (2008) looked at the relationship between the number of disability 
pension claims and the labour market situation using geographical data and 
found a significant negative relationship between the employment rate and 
the number of disability pension claims.
Situation in September 2010. People are entitled to disability pension if they 
have enough qualifying years and lost more than 79% of their work capacity, or 
between 50 and 79% of their work capacity and they cannot be rehabilitated. 
For accident-related disability pensions previous contribution payment is not 
necessary. A further condition is that claimants are out of work or if they work 
they are earning less than twice the disability pension or less than the statutory 
minimum wage. The starting pension is based on the length of the qualifying 
period. Disability pensions are increased in the same manner as the old age 
pensions. If the re-assessment of disability finds that the loss of work capacity 
is less than 79%, entitlement to disability pension stops.
People with a loss of work capacity between 50–79% are eligible for reha-
bilitation allowance for the length of rehabilitation – up to three years. The 
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amount of this is 120% of the disability pension the claimant would be enti-
tled to, and no less than 120% of the minimum rate of disability pension. To 
be eligible for the allowance people have to participate in vocational rehabili-
tation and cooperate with the employment service.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. There were no signifi-
cant changes in disability pensions in the studied period.
Main legislation
Act 84 of 2007 on Rehabilitation Contribution, Government regulation no. 
353/2010 on Pension and Accident-Related Pension Increases.
On-line resources: http://www.orszi.hu/index.php?ID=76
14. Wage bargaining and wage regulation, interest representation
What is the impact on employment? The impact of wage bargaining and wage 
regulation heavily depends on their characteristics (the level of coverage: na-
tional, sectoral or company-level collective agreement), whether it facilitates 
or hinders the adjustment of wages to the equilibrium value – defined by oth-
er factors – and also the structure of the national economy and its level of in-
tegration into the global economy. Therefore there is no one optimum model 
(Calmfors, 1993).
A special institution of wage regulation is the statutory or contractual mini-
mum wage which is the lowest wage an employee or specific groups of employ-
ees must be paid. The employment effect of this is usually negative but it can 
be neutral if the employer has considerable market strength (Manning, 2003). 
The impact of wage setting on employment has not been explored in Hungary. 
The effect of wage coordination on employment during the economic crisis 
was briefly discussed by Köllő (2011). The impact of the statutory minimum 
wage on employment was analysed by Köllő (2001), Reizer (2011) and relevant 
results are also reported by Kézdi and Kónya (2009).
Situation in September 2010. There is a dual system of wage bargaining in 
Hungary. Public sector pay is defined by a separate pay scale in the annual state 
budget. Wages in the business sector – apart from the statutory minimum wage 
mentioned above – are decided freely through decentralised negotiations. The 
lowest amount of pay is limited by the statutory minimum wage set at different 
levels for skilled and unskilled workers since 2006. The minimum wage was 
negotiated in the tri-partite National Interest Conciliation Council (NICC) 
with representatives of the government, employers and employees before Janu-
ary 1, 2011. Union membership is low in Hungary and instead of the sectoral 
wage negotiations, common in some parts of Western Europe (although there 
are some of these in Hungary as well), wages are influenced predominately by 
company level collective agreements. The impact of these on wages however, is 
not significant (Neumann, 2001), and is more common in dense markets and 
state owned companies (Kertesi and Köllő 2003).
Different rates of mini-
mum wage for different 
groups of employees
Tripartite National 
Interest Conciliation 
Council
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Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. There were two im-
portant changes in the system of wage bargaining in 2010. First, the National 
Interest Conciliation Council ceased to exist and was replaced by the Nation-
al Economic and Social Council. This replaces tri-partite negotiations with 
a multi-partite system that includes churches, chambers and representatives 
of non-governmental organisations. Second, the minimum wage is no longer 
decided in negotiations but is set by the government. Furthermore there is a 
new, indirect institution of government intervention: employers that do not 
compensate their workers (earning up to 300,000 forints a month) for any de-
cline in net wages after changes in taxation will be excluded from public pro-
curements and subsidies for two years. Another important change is that the 
statutory minimum wage does not apply to public works participants but is 
set separately by the government. Its amount was 57,000 forints a month in 
2011, 73% of the statutory minimum wage.
Main legislation
Act 22 of 1992 on the Labour Code, Act 7 of 1989 on Strike Action, Act 
73 of 2009 on the National Interest Conciliation Council, Act 74 of 2009 on 
Sectoral Dialogue Committees and Meso-Level Social Dialogue.
New legislation: Act 93 of 2011 on the National Economic and Social Coun-
cil, Government regulation no. 337/2010 on the Statutory Minimum Wage, 
Government regulation no. 352/2010 on the Salary Compensation of Public 
Sector Workers, Act 99 of 2011 on Amending Certain Laws to Encourage the 
Wage Increase of Low-Paid Workers, Act 106 of 2011 on Public Works and 
the Amendment of Public Works Related Regulations, Government regula-
tion no. 170/2011 on Wage Setting and Statutory Minimum Wage in Public 
Works, Act 178 of 2011 on the Amendment of Act 7 of 1989 on Strike Action.
On-line resources: http://www.liganet.hu/
15. Measures related to migration and mobility
What is the impact on employment? The primary effect of internal, external 
and temporary mobility, migration and commuting is that they influence the 
geographical distribution of labour. Its impact on employment is strongly re-
lated to the velocity of capital mobility and price adjustment and flexibility. If 
this is fast then areas with a high migration output would shortly become at-
tractive for capital investment and relocation of workers. If this is slow, then 
increased mobility can preserve the disadvantaged situation of these areas. In-
ternational experience suggests that if this compensating mechanism is very 
slow and changes that could substantially reduce existing disparities can be 
measured in decades (Cseres-Gergely, 2003, Hárs, 2011). Our understanding 
of the recent relationship between mobility and the labour market in Hun-
gary is very limited, but it is likely that the direction and extent of mobility in 
the 1990s was influenced by economic incentives (local wages and unemploy-
Multi-partite National 
Economic and Social 
Council
Limited mobility
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ment (Cseres-Gergely, 2005, 2002). There has been no evaluation of mobility 
schemes to date.
Situation in September 2010.Schemes designed to influence mobility are 
typically small scale and provide assistance for travel to work arrangements, 
living costs and recruitment of workers. There are no special programs to sup-
port international labour mobility; the information system supporting labour 
mobility within Europe has been discussed under section 1 on labour market 
services. Citizens of the European Economic Area and recognised refugees do 
not need a work permit to take up employment in Hungary, however they need 
to register themselves at the local job centre.10 Others can be employed with 
a valid work permit for which the first step is the publication of the vacancies. 
There is a simplified procedure to renew existing work permits.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. The citizens of Hun-
gary can take up employment in Austria and Germany without any restrictions 
as of May 1, 2011. The EU Blue Card can be used in Hungary from 2011 – this 
entitles skilled migrants from outside the EU to live and work in a Member 
State under certain conditions.
Mobility can be enhanced by changes in the housing assistance that can now 
be used to pay for rent as well rather than for winter fuel only.
Main legislation
Act 4 of 1991 on Promoting Employment and Unemployment Benefits, Gov-
ernment Regulation no. 39/1998. (04. 03) on Supports to Reduce the Cost of 
Travel to Work for Workers, and Government regulation no. 355/2007 on the 
Recruitment of Workers and Transitional Provisions on the Free Movement of 
Workers in Hungary, Government regulation no. 355/2009 on the Employ-
ment of Third Country Nationals in the Republic of Hungary, and Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Employment (MoSAE) regulation no. 16/2010 on Issu-
ing Work Permits for Third Country Nationals in Hungary.
New legislation: Government regulation no. 168/2011 on Issuing the EU 
Blue Card and the Amendment of Certain Migration-Related Government 
Regulations.
16. Management, funding and evaluation of employment policy
The management of employment policy sets the policy objectives, elaborates 
programs, monitors implementation and coordinates evaluation. An impor-
tant part of this is the allocation of funding to policy measures and deciding 
about the evaluation of policies – whether it should be continuous monitor-
ing or pre- or post-evaluations.
What is the impact on employment? Effective employment policy that also 
takes into account the economic context can increase employment and reduce 
unemployment contributing to the growth of the economy. To ensure that 
policy interventions are effective they need to be based on the understanding 
10 But this often does not happen 
in the absence of sanctions.
EU Blue Card
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of the existing situation, the potential impact of possible interventions needs 
to be considered and the appropriate interventions need to be selected and im-
plemented. The relationship between policy making and labour market out-
comes has not been investigated empirically.
Situation in September 2010. The top level management of Hungarian em-
ployment policy was the state secretariat responsible for employment policy 
within the Ministry for National Economy. The state secretariat covers two 
main policy areas: vocational and adult education and training (served by a 
department and a ministerial commissioner) and employment policy. This 
field is served by the department of employment strategy and methods and a 
department responsible for the management of labour market programs and 
the Labour Market Fund. These units support the implementation of political 
decisions and prepare policy proposals as required. They are responsible for the 
regulation of employment programs and the policy management of SROP pri-
orities 1 and 2. They also managed certain public works programs (until June 
2011). The Public Employment Service with its regional job centres, local job 
offices and the central Employment and Social Office supported their work. 
The employment service had a dual aim: the administration of unemployment 
benefits and the provision of services to eligible job seekers on the one hand, 
and the implementation of employment policy at the local level on the other. 
The activities of employment policy were supported by various agencies such 
as the National Family- and Social Affairs Institute.
The system was entirely financed from the Labour Market Fund in 2010 that 
provided funding for the majority of employment policy measures.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. There were a num-
ber of important changes in this period. The name of the PES changed to Na-
tional Employment Service (NES) and the Employment and Social Office is 
now called the Employment Office. The re-structuring of regional job centres 
took place in two phases. First they were divided into priority and non-priori-
ty county job centres (the 170 local job offices were temporarily put under the 
management of the latter) and merged into county government offices. As of 
October 1, 2010 county offices were again responsible for the management of 
the local job offices in their own catchment area. The role and possibility of 
the Employment Office to influence policy making and propose measures in-
creased according to its new statute.
With the launch of the new public works program the earlier distinction be-
tween different types of public works schemes ceased to exist from July 1, 2011. 
The Ministry of Interior became responsible for this program, although the lo-
cal administration is carried out by the employment service. The allocation of 
funding to employment policy within the state budget changed significantly: 
a number of items are no longer funded by the Labour Market Fund and as a 
result of the re-structuring the NES no longer has its own budget – except for 
Employment policy 
institutions
Organisational changes
Single public works pro-
gram under the manage-
ment of the Ministry of 
Interior
Major changes in funding
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the Employment Office: the budget of job centres and offices were merged into 
the budget of government offices.
The government adopted the action plan for the new SROP programs that 
sets out the most important components of employment policy for the com-
ing years with hundreds of millions of forints allocated to them.
On January 1, 2011 the Ecostat Government Centre for Impact Assessment 
was established with the objective of assisting government policy making in all 
areas with analytical services, ex ante and ex post program evaluations.
As of January 1, the name of the National Rehabilitation and Social Assess-
ment Institute was changed to the National Rehabilitation and Social Office. 
The new regulation expanded the scope of activities and authority of the office. 
The Office is a forensic and rehabilitation assessment authority, social author-
ity and is also responsible for the inspection of services.
There were changes in the government’s labour market research structure: 
the National Family and Social Affairs Institute is no longer involved in la-
bour market research and labour market researchers were transferred to the 
Employment Office.
Main legislation
Government regulation no. 1250/2010 on the Draft National Reform Pro-
gram for the Implementation of Europe 2020 Strategy and the Preparation 
of the Final Action Plan, Government regulation no. 1114/2011 on the Na-
tional Reform Program of Hungary and its Implementation, Act 153 of 2010 
on the Amendment of Certain Acts in Preparation for the 2011 Budget, Act 
169 of 2010 on the 2011 Budget, Government regulation no. 357/2010 on the 
Amendment of Certain Government Regulations on Social Services in Rela-
tion to the Amendment of Act 171 of 2010, Government decree no. 1246/2011 
on SROP Priority Project 1.1.2 “Improving the employability of disadvan-
taged people (decentralised programs in Convergence regions)”, Government 
decree no. 1148/2011 on Government Measures in Relation to the Introduc-
tion of Electronic Exchange of Data Based on EC regulation no. 883/2004 
on the Coordination of Social Security Systems, Government Regulation no. 
331/2010 on the National Rehabilitation and Social Office, 332/2010. (27. 12) 
Amending Certain Government regulations in Relation to the Activities of 
the National Rehabilitation and Social Office.
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